议价能力影响下供应链间价格和服务竞争均衡策略
[15]Basar T， Olsder J. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory[M].New York： Academic Press， 1982：249-304.
Equilibrium Strategies of Supply Chains with Price and Service Competition
under Bargaining Ability
LI Bai-xun，LIN Jie
(School of Business Administration， Guangdong University of Finance and Economics，Guangzhou 510320， China)
Abstract： Taking two supply chains as research objects， each containing one manufacturer and one retailer， and establishing three decision models respectively： Stackelberg game， Nash game， and Stackelberg-Nash， the paper studies the effect of competition degree between supply chains and manufacturers and retailers′ bargaining ability change on the performance of manufacturers， retailers and customers. Under competing supply chains， no matter the manufacturers act as Stackelberg leaders or the manufacturers and retailers hold the equal bargaining ability， whether the manufacturers can obtain much more profit depends on the service cost coefficients and bargaining ability； in contrast to the manufacturer Stackelberg scenario， the customers are better off when the manufacturers and retailers hold the equal bargaining ability.
Key words：supply chain competition； Stackelberg game； Nash game； service； price
(责任编辑：李江), http://www.100md.com(李柏勋 林洁)
Equilibrium Strategies of Supply Chains with Price and Service Competition
under Bargaining Ability
LI Bai-xun，LIN Jie
(School of Business Administration， Guangdong University of Finance and Economics，Guangzhou 510320， China)
Abstract： Taking two supply chains as research objects， each containing one manufacturer and one retailer， and establishing three decision models respectively： Stackelberg game， Nash game， and Stackelberg-Nash， the paper studies the effect of competition degree between supply chains and manufacturers and retailers′ bargaining ability change on the performance of manufacturers， retailers and customers. Under competing supply chains， no matter the manufacturers act as Stackelberg leaders or the manufacturers and retailers hold the equal bargaining ability， whether the manufacturers can obtain much more profit depends on the service cost coefficients and bargaining ability； in contrast to the manufacturer Stackelberg scenario， the customers are better off when the manufacturers and retailers hold the equal bargaining ability.
Key words：supply chain competition； Stackelberg game； Nash game； service； price
(责任编辑：李江), http://www.100md.com(李柏勋 林洁)